THE DEATH PENALTY IN NEW JERSEY: A
DEFENSE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE t
Joseph E. Krakora*
Attorneys defending capital cases today in New Jersey face the
reality that the tide is turning. Society's demand that the punishment fit the crime combined with the increasing number of New
Jersey Supreme Court decisions upholding death sentences have
made the defense lawyer's job more difficult at both the trial and
appellate levels. Recent changes in the law reflect public demand
for enforcement of the capital punishment law. These changes
have resulted in an expanded definition of capital murder, an expansion of the number of aggravating factors, and enactment of a
victim impact rule. This article discusses these changes in the context of society's increasing demand that the law focus on the nature
of the crime and not on the person of the defendant. An understanding of this trend is essential to an understanding of how we as
a society decide who should be sentenced to death and of how we
as defense lawyers can best represent people accused of capital
murder.
In order to put the recent trend in context, these changes
must be viewed in relation to a political climate that has demanded
increasingly harsher sentences for convicted criminals. Underlying
this trend has been the notion that the punishment should fit the
crime, not the criminal. Judges have been given less discretion in
sentencing. NewJersey, for example, has mandatory sentences for
certain drug offenses, crimes with guns, and carjacking.' Moreover, judges must sentence persons convicted of murder, but not
subject to the death penalty, to a mandatory minimum of 30 years
t This article was delivered by the author as part of the Seton Hall Law Review's
Symposium on Capital Punishment, on November 2, 1995.
* Mr. Krakora received his BA. from Princeton University and J.D. from Cornell
University. Presently, he is First Assistant Deputy Public Defender with the Essex
County Public Defender's Office. Prior to this appointment, he was a litigation associate with Schenck, Price, Smith & King. Mr. Krakora has earned praise for his ability
to defend capital murder cases, including a New Jersey Law Journalarticle focusing on
his successful defense of double-murder suspect, Jesus Suarez.
1 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West 1995) (establishing mandatory minimum
sentences for certain drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of school property);
N.J.SA. § 2C:43-6(c) (establishing mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses committed with firearms); N.J.SA. § 2C:15-2 (establishing mandatory minimum sentences for the crime of carjacking).
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in prison. 2 In other words, certain crimes require a specific punishment regardless of the circumstances of the offense or background of the accused.
For all its political appeal, however, mandatory sentencing
cannot be applied to capital punishment. The United States
Supreme Court requires that the sentencer be permitted to consider not only the circumstances of the crime, but also the background and life history of the defendant.'
Consequently,
mitigating factors generally focus on the individual who committed
the crime.4 This is where the real tension in death penalty jurisdiction has developed. It pits the increasingly popular view that the
2

N.J.S.A. § 2C:11-3(b). This section provides that:
Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder
shall be sentenced, except as provided in subsection c. of this section, by
the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be
eligible for parole or to a specific term of years which shall be between
30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years
before being eligible for parole.

Id.
3 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
4 Under New Jersey's capital punishment statute, jurors are required to weigh
aggravating and mitigating factors during the sentencing phase to determine the appropriate sentence. N.J.S.A. § 2C:11-3(c) (2) (a). Aggravating factors are, in essence,
the legal reasons supporting death as the appropriate sentence. In contrast, mitigating factors represent legal reasons against imposing the death penalty. Unlike aggravating factors, which must be specifically delineated, mitigating factors can include
any information about the defendant's background or life history that the defendant
believes should be taken into consideration. Specifically, mitigating factors include:
(a) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(b) The victim solicited, participated in or consented to the conduct
which resulted in his death;
(c) The age of the defendant at the time of the murder;
(d) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or
intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to
prosecution;
(e) The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(f) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(g) The defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the
prosecution of another person for the crime of murder; or
(h) Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or
record or to the circumstances of the offense.
NJ.SA. § 2C:11-3(c) (5).
Importantly, NJ.S.A. § 2C:11-3(c) (5) (h) is commonly referred to as the "catchall" mitigating factor because it allows a wide range of information to be presented in
mitigation.
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punishment fit the crime without regard to the person of the defendant against the historical view, with constitutional implications,
that the punishment fit the person as well as the crime.
I.

THE EXPANDING DEFINITION OF CAPITAL MURDER

To understand the recent expansion of the definition of capital murder, a little background is necessary. Under New Jersey's
homicide statute, a person is guilty of murder if he purposely or
knowingly causes death or if he purposely or knowingly causes serious bodily injury resulting in death.' In other words, a specific intent to kill is not necessary for a murder conviction; it is enough
that the defendant intended to cause serious bodily injury that results in an unintended death. The statute does not distinguish between the two types of murder in terms of eligibility for the death
penalty.
In State v. Gerald, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court limited death eligibility to those defendants who intended to cause
death. 6 The court based this ruling on the view that it would be a
violation of the New Jersey State Constitution to impose the death
penalty on a defendant who did not purposely or knowingly cause
death, but merely intended to cause serious bodily harm that later
resulted in death.7 In the process, the court overturned a number
of death sentences and directed that jurors be required to make a
specific finding that the defendant acted with intent to kill.8 As a
result, until the recent constitutional amendment, jurors had the
option of finding the defendant guilty of non-capital murder with
the knowledge that the defendant would still receive the thirty-year
minimum mandatory sentence for murder. Needless to say, this
resulted in fewer capital murder verdicts and therefore fewer cases
that even reached the sentencing phase.
Death penalty proponents characterized this as a "loophole"
in the law and sought to expand the definition of capital murder.
Voters closed this loophole by approving a constitutional amendN.J.SA. § 2C:11-3(a).
6 113 NJ. 40, 69, 549 A.2d 792, 807 (1988).
7 Id. ("We hold, on state constitutional grounds, that a defendant who is convicted of purposely or knowingly causing 'serious bodily injury resulting in death'
under NJ.SA. § 20:11-3(a)(1) and (2), or either of them-as opposed to one who is
convicted of purposely or knowingly causing death under those same provisionsmay not be subjected to the death penalty.").
8 See, e.g., State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 407, 581 A.2d 483 (1990); State v. Clausell, 121
N.J. 298, 580 A.2d 221 (1990); State v. Pennington, 119 NJ. 547, 575 A.2d 816 (1990);
State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 575 A.2d 435 (1990); State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 574 A.2d
951 (1990).
5
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ment in 1992. 9 Accordingly, the homicide statute was amended in
1993.10 These changes have effectively overruled the Gerald decision. Thus, the State need not prove that the defendant purposely
or knowingly caused death, but must only prove that the defendant
purposely or knowingly caused the serious bodily injury that resulted in death.
Obviously, the definition of capital murder has been expanded by eliminating the requirement that the defendant intended to cause death. This change is an effort to expose more
defendants to the possibility of capital punishment. It reflects the
public's view that the capital punishment law will be enforced
more often if additional types of murders are made death eligible.
Ironically, in the long run, this change in the law may simply
create new legal issues. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in reaction to these changes, has already suggested that federal constitutional law may impose some limitation on the extent to which a
defendant who did not intend to kill may be sentenced to death.
Specifically, in State v. Harris, the court referred to the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Tison v. Arizona that a participant in a murder who did not kill or intend to kill could still be
sentenced to death as long as he is shown to have acted with reck9 The New Jersey State Constitution was amended on December 3, 1992, to provide specifically that it would not be cruel and unusual punishment to impose a death
penalty on a defendant whose intent had been merely to cause serious bodily injury.
SeeAssembly Bill No. 2113, L. 1993, c.111 (describing the constitutional amendment
and the reasons supporting the amendment). The Assembly Committee on the Judiciary, Law and Public Safety noted that:
As a result of a vote of the people of the State of NewJersey, effective December 3, 1992, Article I, paragraph 12 of the NewJersey Constitution is amended to provide, "It shall not be cruel and unusual
punishment to impose the death penalty on a person convicted of purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury resulting in death who
committed the homicidal act by his own conduct or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of
payment of anything of pecuniary value." The amendment responds to
the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Gerald...
Therefore, in order to clarify legislative intent and thereby avoid
additional judicial construction that might narrow the scope of the law
to comport with the court's view of the legislative intent, this bill would
amend New Jersey's death penalty statute to clearly state that the term
"homicidal act" means conduct that causes "death or serious bodily injury resulting in death."
Id.
10 N.J.S.A. § 2C:11-3(i) (providing that "[flor purposes of this section the term
'homicidal act' shall mean conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting
in death").
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less indifference to whether death would result from his conduct. 1
The New Jersey Supreme Court suggested that this requirement
would apply in a NewJersey case where the State seeks to impose a
death penalty on a defendant whose intent was merely to cause
serious bodily injury which resulted in death. Otherwise, a death
sentence in such a case would violate the federal constitution.
The NewJersey Supreme Court is therefore suggesting an additional element for the definition of capital murder, despite the
amendment to NewJersey's Constitution. This additional element
would be the reckless indifference to the risk of death described in
the Tison case. Interestingly, the Tison defendants were accom12
plices, not principals, but were nevertheless sentenced to death.
Even with NewJersey's expanded definition of capital murder, accomplices, with only two exceptions, are not subject to the death
penalty."3 Indeed, New Jersey still requires that the defendant
commit the murder by his own conduct whether he intends either
to cause death or merely serious bodily injury resulting in death.
This creates the anomaly that, in New Jersey, an accomplice with
intent to kill is not subject to the death penalty, but a principal
intending only to cause serious bodily injury is subject to the death
penalty.
II.

ADDITIONAL AGGRAVATING FACTORS

Recently, New Jersey law further expanded the number of
murder cases likely to be treated as capital cases by adding three
new aggravating factors. These new aggravating factors, designed
to result in more capital verdicts, include: murder ordered or committed as part of a drug operation (drug kingpin); murder committed as part of a terrorist act; and, murder of a child under age
fourteen. 4 They establish three new categories of cases potentially
11 141 N.J. 525, 548, 662 A.2d 333, 344 (1995) (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.

137 (1987)).
12 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137 (1987).
13 N.J.S.A. § 2C:11-3(c) (establishing the requirement that the defendant be
shown to have committed the murder "by his own conduct" before facing a possible
death sentence). The two exceptions are for those who hire the actual killer and for
those who, as drug kingpins, order the murder or solicit it by threat or promise. Id.
14 N.J.SA. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(i)-(k). The remaining aggravating factors are:
(a) The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another murder.
For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed final when
sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating factor regardless
of whether it is on appeal;
(b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or
knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to
the victim;
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subject to the death penalty. There are now eleven aggravating
factors in New Jersey's death penalty statute. 15 Significantly, ten of
the eleven focus on the type of murder committed and not on the
background or prior history of the accused. The only aggravating
factor which looks specifically to the history of the accused is the
one that exposes a previously convicted murderer to the death
penalty.' 6 The remaining aggravating factors make certain types of
murders capital offenses regardless of the background or prior history of the defendant.
The three new aggravating factors reflect a political response
to particular events. The drug kingpin factor provides an obvious
response to the high number of drug-related killings. The terrorist
act factor provides a clear response to cases like the World Trade
Center and Oklahoma City bombings. Finally, the child murder
factor is a clear response to recent cases involving the abduction
and killing of young children.
Perhaps the most important consequence of these new factors
in the trial of capital cases will be a practical one for the attorneys
involved. That consequence will not be so much on the number of
capital cases brought, but on the number of aggravating factors
charged against a particular defendant. For example, a defendant
accused of bombing a building and thereby committing a murder
or murders would previously have been exposed to the death penalty because he had created a grave risk of death to another person
in addition to the victim. 7 Now, he would also likely have to face
(c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim;
(d) The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value;
(e) The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment
or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection,
apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense
committed by the defendant or another;
(g) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing
or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping;
(h) The defendant murdered a public servant ... while the victim was
engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant.
N.J.SA. § 2C:11-3(c) (4) (a)-(h).
'5 See id.
16 N.J.S.A. § 2C:11-3(c) (4) (a).
17 NJ. SA. § 2C:11-3(c) (4) (b).
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the additional aggravating factor of having committed the murder
as part of a terrorist act. Child-killing cases often involve charges of
sexual assault and kidnapping and, thus, were already appropriately treated as capital offenses."i In these cases, the new aggravating factor simply gives jurors an additional reason for imposing a
death verdict in cases in which capital prosecution was already
likely.
III.

THE VICTIM IMPACT RuLE

The third change-enactment of the victim impact evidence
rule-is perhaps the most important one and the one most likely
to increase the number of capital verdicts in New Jersey. The rule
allows the prosecutor to present evidence about the victim's character and the impact of the murder on the victim's survivors whenever the defendant presents evidence of his own character in
mitigation. 9 It specifically allows jurors to give lesser weight to a
defendant's mitigating factors where those factors involve the defendant's character or background.
Again, some historical background is needed to put this
change in context. In Booth v. Maryland,2 ° the United States
Supreme Court held that the presentation of such evidence at a
capital murder trial was unconstitutional as a matter of federal law.
In 1991, however, the Court reversed itself in Payne v. Tennessee,2 1
thus opening the door for individual states to consider the admission of victim-impact evidence. With the passage of this amendment to the death penalty statute, NewJersey's legislature has done
just that.
18 NJ.SA. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(g).
19 NJ.SA. § 2C:11-3(c)(6). The victim impact rule provides that:
When a defendant at a sentencing proceeding presents evidence of the
defendant's character or record pursuant to [N.J.S.A. § 2C:113(c) (5)(h), the provision allowing the defendant to present any mitigating factor relevant to the defendant's character or record or the circumstances surrounding the offense], the State may present evidence of the
murder victim's character and background and of the impact of the
murder on the victim's survivors. If the jury finds that the State has
proven at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and
the jury finds the existence of a mitigating factor pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
§ 2C:11-3(c) (5) (h)], the jury may consider the victim and the survivor
evidence presented by the State pursuant to this paragraph in determining the appropriate weight to give mitigating evidence presented pursuant to [NJ.SA. § 2C:11-3(c) (5) (h)].
Id.
20 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
21 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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Needless to say, this rule raises numerous constitutional, policy, and philosophical issues. 2 2 Assuming, however, that victim impact evidence is ultimately allowed in some form, the law must
determine how the factfinder should use the evidence in making
its sentencing decision. As currently fashioned, New Jersey's rule
allows the jury to consider the evidence only after it finds the existence of specific mitigating factors, and only then as a basis for giving less weight to those mitigating factors. It does not set up
impact on the victim's survivors as an additional aggravating factor.
This is revealing. Although several United States Supreme Court
decisions require that the sentencer be permitted to consider in
mitigation facts about the background, character, and condition of
the defendant, there is no requirement that the sentencer give any
particular weight to those facts. In fact, having considered the defendant's evidence in mitigation, the sentencer presumably can
disregard it entirely in the weighing process. The victim impact
rule will act as an encouragement to jurors to do just that because
it allows them to use the new evidence as a reason to give less
weight to the mitigating factors. It will shift the sentencer's attention away from the defendant and back to the crime and its effects,
clearly the intended purpose. In this sense, the victim impact rule
represents the clearest example of the way in which the law is evolving. It is specifically designed to put the jury's focus on the nature
of the crime.
CONCLUSION

Recognizing the rationales behind these changes is essential
for defense lawyers, particularly at the trial level. It is crucial insofar as jury selection and penalty phase presentations are concerned. Prospective jurors must be assessed carefully by defense
lawyers to gauge their willingness to look beyond the crime itself in
determining the appropriate punishment. In making decisions
about the kinds of evidence to present in mitigation, defense attorneys must keep in mind the public's increasing hostility to what
many view as mere excuses for the commission of violent crimes.
This will be especially difficult in cases where the client's conduct
can only be explained by looking at his upbringing and problems
22 In fact, the constitutionality of the new victim impact rule is currently before the
New Jersey Supreme Court. The State has appealed a ruling by the Hon. Donald S.
Coburn,J.S.C., sitting in Essex County, finding the statute unconstitional on due process grounds. A decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court is expected during the
summer because capital cases around the State are on hold pending resolution of the
appeal. **Decided - State v. Muhammad** update
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he encountered in childhood. In their efforts to convince jurors
that the death penalty should not be imposed, defense attorneys
will have to be increasingly creative and thoughtful in the presentation of penalty phase evidence. It will be a challenge not easily
met.

